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‘THE DREADFUL FLOOD OF DOCUMENTS’: 
THE 1958 PUBLIC RECORD ACT AND ITS AFTERMATH
PART 1: THE GENESIS OF THE ACT
By Paul Rock*
This bipartite paper f lows out of the writing of a history of criminal justice and it attempts to 
resolve why so many state records of scholarly importance were destroyed in the latter half of the 
twentieth century. Since its foundation in 1838, the Public Record Office or PRO, later The 
National Archives, the chief repository of state papers, has confronted the problem of how to 
accommodate a remorselessly growing mass of documents. Shaped by periodic crises and bouts of 
anxious stocktaking, it has sought continually to develop effective ways of culling or ‘weeding’ the 
unwanted record. At the end of the Second World War, especially, the accumulation of papers had 
become so substantial that a new and radical organisation and methods analysis was to be applied 
by the Treasury to what was defined as a failed and antiquarian PRO. A committee under 
the chairmanship of Sir James Grigg elected to give primacy to reducing the volume of records. 
It turned its back on what it took to be the PRO’s discredited staff, techniques and ideology, 
although, ironically, it did warmly endorse the presumption of Sir Hilary Jenkinson, the PRO’s 
deputy keeper, that historians and archivists were quite incapable of identifying which records 
might become of future historical interest. Criteria of historical significance were as a result to be 
introduced slowly and belatedly, and only after Sir Hilary had departed. The outcome was to be 
a structural revolution that was driven principally by an imperative to save money and labour, 
conserve space and do away with as many records as possible, and much that was of scholarly 
interest has been lost in consequence.
Keywords: record management, official history of criminal justice
Introduction
. . . what seems easy to discard now is often not regarded that way later on. If we 
keep collections to a “reasonable” size by getting rid of things not worth saving 
now, we will inevitably make what later generations will see as terrible mistakes. 
Some of what we discard now will be just what they prize, need or want.1 
In April 2009, David Downes, Tim Newburn and I were the last scholars to be 
appointed official historians by the then prime minister, Gordon Brown, and our 
theme was to be the history of criminal justice between 1959 and 1997. The prospectus 
drafted by the Cabinet Office opened by stating that ‘The Official History would 
examine the significant changes in the Criminal Justice System over the last 40 years 
. . . It would chart the position before, during and after our [sic] changes to the system’, 
and, it continued, ‘An appropriate starting point would probably be the Beeching 
*PAUL ROCK is Emeritus Professor of Sociology at the London School of Economics. He is grateful to Elizabeth 
Shepherd, Hans Rasmussen and the anonymous reviewers of Archives for their comments on earlier drafts of this 
paper.
  1 H. Becker, ‘Where do you stop?’ in What about Mozart? What about Murder? (Chicago, 2014), p. 151.
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Report, the abolition of the Assizes and the introduction of the single Crown Court in 
1971’. I submitted the first two volumes on the liberalising legislation of the 1960s and 
the founding of the crown court and the Crown Prosecution Service to the Cabinet 
Office in May 2016. Others will follow.
Our principal sources were interviews; published articles, reports and books; 
private papers; and documents in The National Archives, local archives and university 
collections. Given their criticality, one of our first tasks was to ascertain what files had 
been retained and what had been thrown away, especially by The National Archives, 
the prime repository of files touching on criminal justice policy-making. We soon 
established that much had indeed been thrown away, and we sought to explore how 
it came about that record-keeping in the major archive in England and Wales in the 
latter half of the twentieth century had been organised as much by a desire to destroy 
papers as to preserve them. The quest came to offer an interesting small exercise in 
the sociology of knowledge, examining how the past can be made perceptible or 
imperceptible, and representing perhaps the first such extended analysis of a pivotal 
series of events.2
The Dilemmas of Record Management
Until the passage of the 1838 Public Record Office Act,3 public documents – defined 
as legal records – were dispersed throughout some 60 metropolitan repositories staffed 
by what were called ‘a multitude of imperfectly responsible keepers’;4 ‘administered 
by a bewildering variety of agencies . . . [that was marked by] a lack of a central 
administrative authority;’5 housed in ‘very improper situations and unsuitable 
buildings;’6 without proper management of their care and preservation;7 and subject to 
no ‘superintendence or direction’.8 The result, a Member of Parliament claimed, was 
that ‘the national records of this country [were in a] disgraceful and dangerous state’.9 
There was to be a rescue, and it was a rescue that was mounted as part of the greater 
programme of reforms that rippled across the state in general, and the administration 
of criminal justice in particular, in the 1830s. H.G. Nicholas, the Nuffield reader in the 
comparative study of institutions at the University of Oxford, stated that:
It was no accident that the Public Records Act was preceded, six years earlier, by the 
Great Reform Bill. The substitution of responsibility for neglect, of centralization 
for dispersion, of classif ication for chaos, of salaried experts for pensioners and 
perquisite-collectors, of free access for heavy fees – this was all part of that urge for 
reform which justly entitles the 1830’s and 1840’s to be regarded as the harbingers 
of ordered democracy in Britain.10 
  2 There is, to be sure, a very broad history of record management by Elizabeth Shepherd, Archives and archivists in 
20th century England (Farnham, 2009), but it contains none of the detail offered in this article.
  3 1 & 2 Vic. c. 4. See W. MacDonald; ‘Keeping safely the public records: The PRO Act of 1838’ in Archivaria, 
xxviii, Summer 1989, pp. 151-154.
  4 Report from the select committee on record commission, HC 429, July 1836, p. xxxix.
  5 P. Levine; ‘History in the archives: The Public Record Office and its staff, 1838–1886’ in EHR, ci (398), Jan. 
1986, p. 20.
  6 Report from the select committee on record commission, 565, (House of Commons, 15 Aug. 1836), p. vii.
  7 See ‘The custody of the public records’ in The Times, 18 Oct. 1872.
  8 Report from the select committee on record commission, p. vii.
  9 M. Milnes (Richard Monckton Milnes, f irst Baron Houghton (1809–85), speaking in the Commons, 20 Feb. 
1849, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1849/feb/20/public-record-office (accessed 14 Nov. 2016).
 10 H.G. Nicholas, ‘Public records: The historian, the national interest and off icial policy’, in International Journal, 
xx (1), 1964/5, p. 34.
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What a later deputy keeper of the records, the effective manager of the Public Record 
Office, called the ‘two greatest desiderata – centralized control and centralized 
housing’,11 were achieved by entrusting a ‘pragmatic Benthamite’, Lord Langdale,12 
the master of the rolls, the second most senior judge in England and Wales, responsible 
(as his title suggested) for the records or ‘rolls’ of the chancery court, to ‘keep safely 
the public records’ – defined somewhat elastically – in one place, a single institution 
and a new building, in a professionally staffed13 Public Record Office (PRO), that 
was opened formally in Chancery Lane in 1856.14 In 1854, that embryonic Office’s 
collection was amalgamated with that of the State Paper Office,15 but the consigning 
of documents and the regulations for their safekeeping or destruction by government 
departments remained somewhat haphazard until the Public Record Office Acts of 
187716 and 1898,17 and there still remained no formal duty on departments to transfer 
their papers to the new Office or make them accessible to the public18 (the Home 
Office, for example, did not routinely forward its papers until 1880).
Particularly important was Section 1 of the 1877 Act, under which the master of 
the rolls was empowered to order the destruction of what were called ‘documents of 
not sufficient public value to justify their preservation in the Public Record Office’, 
providing not only that the destruction schedules did not include documents ‘which 
can reasonably be considered of legal, genealogical or antiquarian use or interest, or 
which give any information not to be found elsewhere’, but also that the schedules 
themselves had been agreed jointly by the head of the department and the master of 
the rolls and laid before Parliament for four weeks.
The records may have become better tended and organised19 but the space that 
was allotted to house them was insufficient from the first. ‘In effect’, reported Aidan 
Lawes, an assistant keeper, in the PRO’s own autobiography, ‘the Office was acting 
as an agency for other departments’,20 and the departments of an increasingly active 
state were generating more and more paper. In 1853 alone, it was estimated that some 
7,000,000 documents had piled up in government offices,21 and much of that paper 
 11 The deputy keeper of records; ‘Preservation and housing of public records’ in The Times, 24 May 1951.
 12 Lord Langdale, 1783–1851, was master of the rolls between 1836 and 1851. A friend of Jeremy Bentham, and 
a liberal, he has been described as the ‘father of record reform’. His biographer, G.F.R. Barker, continued, ‘His 
perseverance led the government to consent to provide an adequate repository for the national records’ (ODNB). It 
was he who agitated for the transfer to one, purpose-built and professionally-staffed, new depository, ‘the strong box 
of the Empire’, the records that were then scattered in and around London: see J. Cantwell, The Public Record Office: 
1838–1958, (1991). Elsewhere, Cantwell argues that Lord Langdale was more than a little reluctant to take charge of 
the reforms stemming from the 1838 Act (‘The 1838 Public Record Office Act and its aftermath: A new perspective’ 
in Journal of the Society of Archivists, vii (5), pp. 278, 280).
 13 Levine, ‘History in the archives’ pp. 20-41.
 14 The building was constructed on a site that had been in the possession of the master of the rolls and used to store 
the rolls since 1377. (See an undated booklet published by King’s College – Chancery Lane Library & Information 
Services Centre – which had acquired the building from the Rolls Estate in 1998).
 15 The State Paper Office was founded in 1578 to house the papers of the two Secretaries of State – the communications 
of diplomats; treaties; and correspondence between ministers, the Privy Council and with the sovereign. See Susan 
Palmer; ‘Sir John Soane and the Design of the New State Paper Office, 1829–1834’ in Archivaria, lx, 2005, pp. 39-70, 
http://archivaria.ca/index.php/archivaria/article/view/12514/13642 / (accessed 15 Nov. 2016).
 16 An Act ‘to amend the Public Record Office Act’, 1838. 
 17 A minor piece of legislation, whose long title was ‘An Act to amend the Public Record Office Act’ 1877.
 18 Parts of this section are based on The National Archives; ‘History of the Public Records Acts’, http://www.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/information-management/legislation/public-records-act/history-of-pra/ (accessed 15 Nov. 2016).
 19 By 1872, The Times (‘The custody of the Public Records’, 18 Oct. 1872) could report that, whereas in the past 
‘The records were imperfectly arranged; they possessed but the most meagre of indexes; they were dispersed in 
various establishments; and to discover what one was in search of ended more often than not in disappointment. 
Respect for the past and the new phase upon which modern history has entered have now happily changed neglect 
into care and dispersion into consolidation’.
 20 A. Lawes, Chancery Lane 1377–1977: ‘The Strong Box of the Empire’, (Kew, 1996), p. 22.
 21 ‘State papers and record off ices’ in The Times, 14 May 1859.
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would inevitably be intended for the archives. ‘Hardly a day passes’, The Times stated 
in 1872, ‘but that important documents either from the Treasury, the Foreign Office, 
the Colonial Office, the Home Office, the Board of Trade, the Admiralty, the War 
Office, or other departments of state are lodged for preservation and arrangement 
within the iron cages of the Fetter-lane Repository’.22 The Public Record Office had 
had as a result to be extended between 1863 and 1873, and again, by the addition of 
two wings, between 1892 and 1896. 
Matters came to a head in the 1940s, partly because documents had been allowed to 
pile up uncontrollably before23 and during the Second World War.24 Although tons of 
records were being destroyed each year, there remained what Sir Hilary Jenkinson,25 
the then deputy keeper of the records, and, in practical effect, the working head of 
the Public Record Office, called in 1949 a continuing and ‘enormous increase in 
accruals of modern Archives’.26 To be sure, a succession of improvised remedies had 
been attempted over the years to manage the backlog– one being the establishment in 
1943 by the master of the rolls of a committee which recommended a three-stage life 
cycle for records – ‘current, semi-current and selection for permanent preservation’, 
and the recourse, under what Sir Hilary called the ‘Limbo’ plan, f loated in March 
1944 but implemented later, first to storing tens of thousands of feet of semi-current 
departmental papers awaiting disposal in ‘deep shelters’ at London Underground stations 
at Goodge Street, Belsize Park, Clapham Common, Clapham North and Camden 
Town, and then to the requisition of a former ordnance factory at Yeading,27 and the 
conversion of buildings into a ‘branch’ repository at Ashridge, with an extra 10 miles 
of shelving, and a ‘limb’ repository in Hayes in the early 1950s.28 There was to be the 
assignment in 1949 of John Collingridge, who had joined the Public Record Office as 
an assistant keeper in 1926, to the new post of liaison officer charged with ‘establishing 
and maintaining closer relations with depositing Departments and studying the special 
problems incidental to their Records’.29 But it was never enough. Government had not 
fully planned for the sheer extent of the problem that was thought to have arisen by 
mid-century.
 22 ‘The Public Records’ in The Times, 27 Dec. 1872.
 23 Roger Ellis, lecturer in archive administration at University College, London, and formerly principal assistant 
keeper, reported that a number of departments ‘unable to keep up, accumulated a bulk of dormant Records so 
daunting that less and less effort was made to deal with them’ (‘The “limbo” plan for departmental records’ in 
OandM Bulletin, vii (1), Feb. 1952, p. 13). 
 24 Under the heading ‘Elimination of records of ephemeral value accumulating in modern departments’, Sir Hilary 
Jenkinson reported that ‘Work in this Section as a result of War-time accumulations continues to be heavy’. 109th 
report of the deputy keeper of the records (1949 for 1947), p. 5. See also H. Jenkinson, ‘British Archives and the War’ in 
The American Archivist, vii (1), Jan. 1944 ) pp. 1-17.
 25 Sir Hilary Jenkinson, 1882–1961, took a degree in classics at Cambridge and then entered the PRO in 1906, 
becoming deputy keeper from 1938 until his retirement in1954. His entry in the ODNB says that ‘In the course 
of his lifetime Jenkinson played a leading part in establishing in England principles which should govern the care 
of records, in rousing public interest in their preservation, and in providing for the professional training of their 
custodians, who should be, as he preferred to call them, archivists rather than amateurs with antiquarian tastes. His 
gift for personal relationships undoubtedly went far to promote the cause he had at heart, although his pursuit of 
perfection betrayed him into a doctrinaire advocacy of ideas and practices which created diff iculties and brought 
frustration’.
 26 111th report of the deputy keeper of the records (1950 for 1949), p. 3.
 27 See for example, the 109th report of the deputy keeper of the records, p. 5.
 28 It was not until the end of 1969 to that permission had f inally to be given to start constructing an entirely new and 
much larger repository for the PRO at Kew, the present site of what is now the National Archives or TNA. The new 
building was opened in 1977 with 75 miles of shelving (‘Public Record Office starts to move house on Monday’ in 
The Times, 12 May 1977). By 2014, it had come to house some 11 million items on190 kilometres – or 118 miles – of 
shelving (and, it was then estimated, an extra 2 km or just under 1¼ miles of space were still required every year).
 29 111th report of the deputy keeper of the records, p. 3. His posting was thought to be something of an unwelcome 
deformation of the core duties of the PRO: the deputy keeper of the records reported that, although it ‘was almost 
unavoidable . . . [it] seems likely at no distant date to alter considerably the balance of work in the Department . . .’
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In 1957, Lord Evershed, the master of the rolls, described to the House of Lords the 
way in which the law and practice of record management supposedly functioned. It 
rested on a system that had been devised a century before for legal records in a simpler 
world, a more rudimentary government and much, much less paper:
whatever was in the mind of my predecessor, Lord Langdale, in 1845, when he 
made with the then Home Secretary, Lord John Russell, the somewhat casual 
and typically English arrangement upon which the management of departmental 
records has since depended, that arrangement did not provide – and, indeed, as 
I understand it, was quite incapable of providing – any real solution in modern 
circumstances to the problem of selection. Indeed, I think it may even be said 
that the arrangement negatived the possibility of such a solution. On the one 
hand, it provided, according to Lord Langdale’s letters, that the Public Record 
Office should be but the agent of the Government Departments in preserving the 
records and receiving them from the Departments. On the other hand, in the light 
especially of slightly later legislation, it absolutely prevented the Departments from 
acting as their own destroyers or selectors of documents.30 
‘If intended to be a temporary convenience’ he had earlier explained, the arrangement 
so negotiated ‘has, in fact, lasted ever since. . . . no single document coming into 
existence in any Department of State can be destroyed save after a procedure requiring 
the personal co-operation of the master of the rolls; and in theory (it is said) the master 
of the rolls could secure the removal of any papers from the desk of any Minister to 
the Public Record Office’.31 That was the formal position, but informally, and under 
growing strain, a proliferation of ad hoc, home-grown and often unsanctioned practices 
appear to have mushroomed across the Whitehall departments. 
Many disposal procedures were actually quite unorganised. John Collingridge 
recounted how in a number of departments ‘weeding’ could be little more than ‘an 
occasional operation, executed by staff temporarily diverted from the normal work 
of the department’.32 It worked only where documents were capable of being listed; 
the ‘schedules so compiled and approved were in fact generally brief and the terms 
necessarily wide and often vague’;33 ‘No possibility exist[ed] of examination of the 
individual documents’,34 and, to cap it all, departments were given ‘a continuing 
authority to get rid of worthless papers throughout the whole range of their records’.35 
Moreover, until a comparatively late date, those who received the documents, the 
assistant keepers at the Public Record Office, were not formally trained in archival 
practice.36 They regarded themselves, said Hans Rasmussen, the coordinator of special 
collections technical at Louisiana State University and an historian of the archivists’ 
profession of the period, primarily as civil servants rather than as archivists.37
 30 HL Deb 16 Dec. 1957, ccvi, cols 1147-81.
 31 TNA, LCO 4/282, memorandum, 8 Nov. 1954.
 32 J. Collingridge; ‘Record management in England since the Grigg Report’ in Journal of the Society of Archivists, ii 
(6) (Oct. 1962), p. 242.
 33 P. Jones, ‘The Grigg Report’ in Journal of the Society of Archivists, I (1), Apr. 1955, p. 7.
 34 The Master of the Rolls speaking in HL Deb 16 Dec. 1957, ccvi, cols 1147-81.
 35 J. Collingridge; ‘Implementing the Grigg Report’ in Journal of the Society of Archivists, i (7), Apr. 1958, p. 179. 
 36 See M. Roper; ‘The Public Record Office and the Profession’ in Journal of the Society of Archivists, x (4), Oct. 1989, 
p. 162. Michael Roper was the keeper of public records between 1988 and 1992.
 37 See H. Rasmussen, ‘Endangered records and the beginning of professionalism among archivists in England, 
1918–1945’ in Library & Information History, xxvii (2), June 2011, 90-91.
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It was only when a committee under the chairmanship of Sir James Grigg, a former 
secretary of state for war,38 a man described by Edward Playfair, the Treasury official 
who nominated him, as ‘bubbling over with mental energy and at the top of his 
form’,39 was appointed in 1952 to review the existing arrangements that systematic 
reform may be said to have begun on any scale.40 The committee was the government’s 
answer to what John Collingridge called ‘the very alarming state of affairs revealed 
by the information produced by Departments in response to a questionnaire sent out 
by an organisation and methods team of the Treasury in 1951’.41 The Treasury was 
the department of state officially responsible for the PRO. It provided its premises for 
the work of the committee, and, through its minister, the chancellor of the exchequer, 
was accountable for its doings to Parliament. It was also the regulatory department 
within Whitehall where organisation and methods analysis was being developed 
with some gusto;42 and it had come to conclude that at a time of harsh financial 
cuts that were falling especially heavily on the PRO,43 ‘a radical change might be 
required in present practice in order to ensure only documents worthy of permanent 
retention were passed to the Public Record Office, and to ensure that the problem of 
providing permanent storage space did not grow out of hand’.44 The organisation and 
methods team had been prompted to investigate existing procedures not only by the 
 38 Sir James Grigg (1890–1964) was successively a civil servant, serving as principal private secretary to a number 
of chancellors of the exchequer between 1921 and 1930; the chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue in 1930; the 
permanent under-secretary of state for war, 1939–1942; and the Member of Parliament for East Cardiff between 
1942 and 1945 (ODNB).
 39 TNA, T 222/538, Edward Playfair to Sir Edward Bridges, 1 Feb. 1952.
 40 Committee on departmental records; Report, Cmd. 9163, 1954. G. Martin, the keeper of public records between 
1982 and 1988, remarked in 1988 that the committee’s recommendations ‘have served the Office and its users ever 
since’. G. Martin (1988), ‘The Public Records in 1988’ in The records of the nation: The Public Record Office 1838–1988, 
ed. G. Martin and P. Spufford, (Woodbridge, 1988), p. 22. 
 41 Collingridge; ‘Implementing the Grigg Report’, p. 179. The report revealed that the 53 departments consulted 
housed some 1,100,000 linear feet of records not still in current use but not yet old enough to be reviewed for 
destruction; and 300,000 linear feet of records awaiting possible destruction, of which it was estimated that 50,000 
would be passed to the PRO for preservation. The Treasury inquiry into the PRO was only one of a number 
conducted at the time. Others included the Tate Gallery, the Wallace Collection, the National Maritime Museum 
and the British Museum.
 42 The methodology had f irst been advocated in 1915 by the Royal commission on the civil service, the MacDonnell 
commission, Cd 7832, and it grew in and around Whitehall, but it appears only to have come properly into its own 
in the latter half of the 1940s. See C. Krishnamoorthy, ‘Organisation and methods in the British government’ in The 
Indian Journal of Political Science, xiv (2), Apr.-June 1953, pp. 113-122 and I. Pitman, ‘Organisation and methods: An 
important select committee report’ in Public Administration, xxvi (1), Mar. 1948, pp. 1-9. One source, The Civil Service 
Yearbook, was not published in the war years between 1941 and 1945, but it appears that an organisation and methods 
division was established at some point in that time. In 1940 there was no reference to a Treasury organisation and 
methods division, but by 1946, the division was 69 strong. By 1951, the year of the inspection of the PRO, it was 
119 strong. The Treasury organisation and methods division issued its f irst OandM Bulletin for the diffusion of news 
ideas and opinions among organisation and methods officers in the civil service in August 1945 with a circulation of some 
480 as part of a pioneering attempt to feel ‘their way through uncharted seas’ (H. Wilson Smith, Foreword, OandM 
Bulletin, I (1), Aug. 1945, p. 1. H. Wilson Smith was Treasury under-secretary). It also appears to have initiated a 
Treasury O and M course at much the same time: see ‘The Treasury course – a commentary’, OandM Bulletin, iv 
(1), Feb. 1949, p. 21. 
 43 A draft letter to the master of the rolls from Sir Edward Bridges of 1 Feb. 1952 recited that ‘as it happens, the cut 
hits the Public Record Office arithmetically almost harder than anyone else’, TNA, T 222/538. The PRO Museum, 
founded in 1886, was to be closed that year at a saving of four posts and some £1,300 per annum (HC Deb 13 May 
1952 cd, cols 103-4W). Aneurin Bevan’s comment was that ‘It may be that we have to make economies in this or 
that direction, but the trouble is – as I have said on a number of occasions – that in the hierarchy of the Government 
machine the Treasury is now practically supreme. That may suit some people, but it has a most appalling consequence 
on public administration . . .’ (HC Deb 14 July 1952, cdiii, cols 1808-90).
 44 TNA, T 222/538, Indecipherable, note to Mr Simpson, the director of organisation and methods at the Treasury, 
29 Nov. 1951.
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very similar ‘alarm expressed by the [1949] Hoover Commission45 on the unwieldy 
size of public records’46 in the United States;47 but also by an observation made in the 
1950 Webb Memorial Lecture, ‘The History of our Times’, that had been delivered by 
Professor Sir William Hancock, an official historian and the director of the Institute 
of Commonwealth Studies at the University of London.48 Sir William had reported 
that 12,000,000 files of war records in the Board of Trade alone were awaiting the 
record managers’ attention. They were expected to require 16 miles of shelving; 
existing procedures simply would not be able to cope;49 and the fearsome logistical and 
economic implications of what lay ahead alarmed Whitehall.50 ‘Think’, Sir William 
warned, ‘of what is coming to the Public Record Office!’51 
Sir Hilary Jenkinson did think, and he rejected most of the assumptions, procedures 
and findings which the team had mobilised to confront the problem. He may have 
agitated for change – indeed, Cantwell called him a ‘thorn in the Treasury’s f lesh’52 – 
but he did not accept the Treasury’s diagnosis. Difficulties resided not in the PRO, he 
said, but elsewhere, in the record-management procedures practised by government 
departments across Whitehall. The remedy for such an unrestrained increase in 
records lay at the registry stage, ‘the point at which Documents began to accumulate’, 
because ‘vast quantities of papers are made and distributed unnecessarily’; ‘working, 
routine and formal papers are filed and put away equally without thought’; and 
systems of filing seemed to be devised ‘specially to make any separation of sheep and 
goats laborious and difficult’. ‘All these troubles could’, he concluded, ‘be mitigated 
if not eliminated by intelligent organisation in registry’.53 In short, the Treasury’s 
response was ill-judged and unwelcome. It did not know what it was talking about. 
The fault did not lie with the PRO, and its archivists should not be treated as rude 
mechanicals whose actions could be subjected to the unpolished methods of time and 
motion study:
 45 Hoover commission on the organization of the executive branch of the government, Report, (New York, 1949). 
The commission reported on pp. 78 and 80 that ‘the maintenance of records costs the Federal Government enormous 
sums annually. The records now in existence would f ill approximately six buildings each the size of the Pentagon. 
In 1948, some 18 million square feet of space were f illed with records. Our task force estimates that, on the basis 
of rental value alone, the space costs for this volume of records is at least 20 million dollars annually’. And the 
number of records was increasing alarmingly, from 5m cubic feet in 1933, to 10m in 1938 and over 15m in 1944. 
Its recommendation was that there should be a new record management bureau in the Office of General Services; 
a new federal record management law to provide for the more effective preservation, management, and disposal of 
government records; and an ‘adequate record management program in each department and agency’ (p. 80).
 46 TNA, T 222/538, Indecipherable, note to Mr Simpson, 29 Nov. 1951.
 47 The Treasury organisation and methods division had taken an avid interest in what was called ‘this very general 
and rather devastating examination of the executive machine as a whole’ (Anon, ‘Reorganisation of U.S. government 
departments: Report of the Hoover Commission’ in OandM Bulletin, iv (2), Apr. 1949, p. 19). It was to publish three 
different synopses of aspects of the commission’s work, although it did not touch on record management – itself a 
very small part of the report.
 48 Sir William Hancock (1898–1988), occupied the Chichele chair of economic history at the University of Oxford 
between 1944 and 1949. In 1957, he returned to his native Australia to teach at Canberra.
 49 ‘Time’, he said, ‘does his weeding through the agency of off icials working by rules . . .’ Insuff iciently valuable 
documents were to be destroyed, but ‘Unfortunately, the criteria of value are variable and subjective’. And the task 
had grown to such proportions that ‘I doubt whether the old procedures of the Public Record Office can cope with 
it. . . . Some of the most precious grain of war-historical record never got into the registered f iles and may therefore 
never come to the Public Record Office: conversely, in the registered f iles of the war period there are tares by the 
million; but good wheat is mingled with the tares. How can they be separated?’ The History of our times, (1951), 
pp. 8-9.
 50 TNA, T 222/538, Note to Edward Playfair, 28 Dec. 1951.
 51 Ibid, p. 8.
 52 Cantwell, ‘The 1838 Public Record Office Act’, p. 286.
 53 TNA, T 222/538, Hilary Jenkinson, ‘Public Records being some notes on OM 68/3/01’, 11 Dec. 1951.
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The Officials of the Treasury who have specifically studied the subject should 
be able to advise other Departments in regard to the technique of Secretarial, 
Accounting and Establishment work is admitted: but in institutions such as the 
Public Record Office . . . (in strong contrast to the larger Ministries and Public 
Departments) work of this kind forms a small proportion of what had to be done. 
The large part of the time is devoted to tasks of a highly technical character 
the execution of which . . . necessitates special training; the methods employed 
have been chosen or worked out over a long period of years; and policy in such 
apparently simple matters as the locking of doors or opening of windows, the 
transport of parcels or the location of Staff, is based on considerations different 
from those which govern such proceedings elsewhere, and is not always readily 
intelligible except to persons having experience of the work of the institution 
concerned. I was therefore doubtful how far Officials having no such experience 
or training would be in a position to advise us in regard to the major part of our 
duties . . . I felt bound to take the position that . . . none of the proposals made 
with a view to Staff reductions were [sic] feasible . . . Secondly, the proposals, so 
far as they took the form of suggested changes in method or equipment were . . . 
all impracticable . . .54
But reorganisation could not be stalled. There was a bullish tone to many of the 
arguments propounded by the Treasury organisation and methods division at the time, 
and opposition could be dismissed as merely reactionary, unreasonable and obstructive. 
‘It has been said,’ a contemporary article in the Department’s OandM [organisation and 
methods] Bulletin remarked, ‘that scientific progress is the embodiment of development 
and change, and the resistance to changes proposed or introduced poses to the O and 
M officer a problem no less great than the challenges of effectiveness and efficiency’.55 
Those who blocked reform must, it was surmised, have done so because of their 
reluctance for personal reasons to accept a disturbance to the status quo; the difficulty 
of being hoisted out of ‘the grooves into which they have become well moulded’; 
their lack of information about what was proposed; or their selfishness, old age or lack 
of confidence. Any non-cooperation had to be overcome in the name of what was 
‘logical and desirable’.56 
The 69-year old Sir Hilary, moulded in the grooves of the PRO for some 45 years, 
wedded to an older way of working, had little prospect of securing sympathy or support. 
Like poor William Huskisson, he stood in the way of a new and very different set of 
grooves, the ringing grooves of change. It was a foretaste of the quarrel between Whigs 
and Tories, modernisers and conservatives, that would resound across the face of public 
administration in general, and the criminal justice system in particular, throughout the 
latter half of the century, and the outcome was almost always the same. The progress of 
rational reform could not be brooked. Sir Edward Bridges, the permanent secretary at 
the Treasury, was certainly not to be brooked. His reply to Sir Hilary was unyielding: 
‘It seems to me that we should now consider whether there should be an enquiry into 
the fundamentals of the Public Record system and, if so, what form it should take’.57
Besides, there was a new and powerful political impetus driving change. Sir Edward 
recorded that the idea of setting up an enquiry had received strong endorsement 
 54 114th report of the deputy keeper of the records (1954 for 1952), pp. 4-5.
 55 J. Thomson, ‘Resistance to change’ in OandM Bulletin, vi (4), Aug. 1951, p. 44. 
 56 Ibid, p. 48. Other commentaries were less strident. See, for instance, B. Schaffer, ‘The British Treasury: Changes 
over the last generation’ in Australian Journal of Public Administration, ix (3-4), (Sept. 1950), pp. 329-347. Schaffer, a 
former member of the Treasury O and M division, on p. 341 described it as ‘very much in the position of a humble 
adviser . . .’
 57 TNA, T 222/538, 20 Dec. 1951.
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from Sir Winston Churchill, the prime minister, who had been told by David Eccles, 
the minister of works, that his department would have to spend £300,000 in 1952 
(equivalent to some £8,226,000 at 2015 prices) on filing cabinets in Whitehall offices:58 
This led the Prime Minister to suggest that we ought to devote more attention to 
destroying old papers so as to avoid the demand for a lot of new filing equipment. 
I was happy to be able to tell the Prime Minister that we had in mind the 
appointment of a Committee to consider this business of records. It is clear that the 
Prime Minister would like this dealt with as a matter of urgency and at a rather 
high level.59 
And it was in that very particular context that the next steps were taken60 and 
defended,61 being propelled by what the chancellor of the exchequer, R.A. Butler, 
described as ‘a side wind before the Cabinet’.62 Ministers were, he said, ‘discussing 
troubles of accommodation and the accumulation of papers was mentioned as being 
one of the difficulties. The Cabinet invited me to arrange for the appointment of a 
Committee . . .’63 
Preliminary discussions about the scope of the Grigg committee’s work focused solely 
on the economic and logistical difficulties posed by the huge number of documents 
threatening to engulf government departments and the PRO. The Treasury’s director 
of organisation and methods was told in December 1951: 
more than a quarter million linear feet of shelving could be cleared if weeding were 
brought up to date . . . One of the main points to be considered in the enquiry 
now proposed is how Departments should tackle this job of weeding. When ought 
the job to be done? . . . Who should do the weeding? What outside assistance is 
desirable? (P.R.O. or other experts). What can be done at an early stage in the life 
of important papers to ensure they will survive?64
At an informal preparatory meeting held two months later, and ominously titled ‘The 
Alarming Accumulation of Modern Departmental Records’, Sir Hilary assented to the 
idea that there was a crisis but then recited his earlier argument that there were: 
 58 His ministry was responsible for the installation and maintenance of services in the various buildings occupied 
by the PRO.
 59 TNA, T 222/538, Sir Edward Bridges to Mr Simpson, 21 Dec. 1951.
 60 The Cabinet minutes of 5 Feb. 1952 read ‘The Cabinet – (1) Approved in principle the proposals put forward 
by the Minister of Works . . . (2) Invited the Minister of Works to send to his colleagues lists of premises which he 
thought their Departments might surrender by a given date; and invited all Ministers in charge of Departments to 
support the efforts which the Minister of Works was making to curb the demands of Departments for off ice space, 
and to comply with the approved standards of off ice accommodation. (3) Invited the Minister of Works to report in 
a month’s time the progress made in securing economy in the use of off ice space by Government Departments. (4) 
Invited the Chancellor of the Exchequer to arrange for the appointment of a Committee to make an urgent review 
of the arrangements for preserving valuable off icial records and for destroying those which were of no permanent 
value or interest.’
 61 R.A. Butler, the chancellor of the exchequer, informed the prime minister on 18 Apr. 1952 that ’You have 
mentioned to me more than once the amount of building and shelf space taken up by departmental records of which 
many could easily be destroyed. The last time the question came up was at Cabinet on the 5th February when I was 
invited to arrange for the appointment of a committee to make an urgent review of the arrangements for preserving 
valuable off icial records and for destroying those which were of no permanent value or interest . . .’, TNA, T 
222/538. 
 62 There are no other references to the incident, Sir James Grigg or the Committee on Public Records in Butler’s 
many biographies and autobiography.
 63 TNA, T 222/538, Draft letter from the chancellor of the exchequer to the master of the rolls, 8 Feb. 1952. 
 64 TNA, T 222/538, G.B. Crichton, senior organisation off icer, to Mr Simpson, the director of organisation and 
methods at the Treasury, 4 Dec. 1951.
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two problems for investigation both very large but both in their elements simple. 
The first was the present vast accumulation of Records, largely unweeded, in 
numerous expensive ad hoc Repositories – the problems of lessening their bulk 
and decreasing the expense of their housing. The second was that of f inding means 
to prevent a continuance or recurrence of the trouble’.65
The resulting note of the meeting stated that ‘It was . . . strongly maintained that 
the Terms of Reference [of the committee] should be to restrict the Inquiry to the 
formulation of the practical means for dealing as a matter of urgency with [those] two 
known and practical problems’.66 That was how the task was to be presented first to the 
new chairman, Sir James Grigg,67 and then to his future colleagues:68 the increase in 
the volume of departmental papers, prompted by the growth of government business 
and aided by the typewriter and duplicating machine, was accelerating so fast that it 
was on the verge of becoming unmanageable.69 It was a pressing crisis that demanded 
a pressing solution, and the committee’s formal terms of reference would be to ‘review 
the arrangements for the preservation of the records of Government departments . . . 
in the light of the rate at which they are accumulating and of the purposes which they 
are intended to serve’.70 The master of the rolls, Lord Evershed, would later recall in a 
memorandum to the lord chancellor: 
There are in the Public Record Office about 40 miles of Records covering the 
whole period of English history. The quantity of documents now in Government 
Departments awaiting sorting and transfer and representing about 50 years only 
of administration is said to amount to about 1½ times the whole content of the 
Public Record Office. . . . The problem of Departmental Records having assumed 
such proportions that it was in danger of reaching administrative breakdown, the 
“Grigg Committee” . . . was appointed by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer 
and myself ’.71
An editorial in The Times commented that ‘No country in the world compares 
with England for the copiousness and continuity of its public records. No age in 
history compares with the present for the abundance with which Governments 
 65 TNA, T 222/538, The alarming accumulation of modern departmental records: Notes of an informal discussion 
at the Public Record Office, 17 Jan. 1952.
 66 Ibid.
 67 In a draft letter inviting him to chair the committee, it was suggested that Sir Edward Bridges should put it that 
‘One of our growing problem is the accumulation of departmental records. Each year more paper is put on f iles of 
Government departments. Much of it has to be preserved in any case and even where destruction is permissible it is 
apt not to keep up with creation. The result is not only a problem of housing but also of availability. . . .’ TNA, T 
222/538, Draft of 7 Apr. 1952.
 68 Edward Playfair of the Treasury wrote to one prospective member, Professor Robertson of Cambridge, who proved 
unable to serve, ‘We have been getting more and more appalled by the problem of departmental records; they pile up 
and up – you have watched them accumulating with your own eyes. . . .’, TNA, T 222/538, 3 May 1952. Another, 
undated draft letter in the same f ile, despatched to those who had accepted the invitation, reiterated the same point: 
‘I am sure I need not stress to you how fearsome a problem we are faced with these days in sorting and storing the 
papers produced in the course of conducting the business of the many Government departments. . . . The problem 
is most urgent’. The letter that was eventually sent on 28 May 1952 opened less dramatically: ‘There is growing 
uneasiness about the problem presented by the accumulation of the records of Government departments. . . .’
 69 And that sense of a crisis of capacity has pervaded reports about the state of other national archives. For example, 
see Report of the director of national archives [of Ireland] for 2012, http://www.nationalarchives.ie/wp-content/
uploads/2013/09/Report-of-the-Director-of-the-National-Archives-2012.pdf, 2.19 (accessed 15 Nov. 2016).
 70 The Times, 28 June 1952.
 71 TNA, PRO 1/1445, memorandum, Public Record Office and the Grigg Report, n.d.
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daily manufacture and accumulate documentary evidence of their activity’.72 
What does not seem to have been envisaged as a viable solution at the time was 
any compensatory increase in the PRO’s permanent storage capacity. The Treasury 
had always been grudging when asked to approve such expenditure,73 and that 
was not the direction which thinking was encouraged to take. In 1954, after the 
committee had done its work, D.B. Wardle, assistant keeper, first class, responsible 
for repository and photography matters at the PRO, wrote to David Evans, the 
new deputy keeper, that ‘the statement of the [Grigg] Report to the effect that it 
is the inescapable duty of the Government of a civilised state to make adequate 
arrangements for the preservation of its Records might I feel have been followed 
(at the appropriate point) by mention of the fact that there has been no building of 
permanent accommodation specifically designed for the purpose of housing the Public 
Records during this century, and that for fifty years and more a series of temporary 
expedients has been adopted to deal with the overf low from Chancery Lane’.74 But his 
was virtually a lone protest. 
Perhaps there never could be quite enough space for everything that might and 
should have been retained, but the much-trumpeted crisis of overf low did frame the 
genesis and work of the new committee and it was held to follow, in the words of 
The Times editorial, that ‘The problem of preservation, if it means preservation for 
use, becomes in practice the problem of how, what, and when to destroy’. It was to 
be that formulation of the problem which provided the Leitmotiv of much of what 
followed, and it allowed record management all too easily to become record scrapping. 
Hans Rasmussen described ‘the spirit of this movement as one of rather pragmatic 
managerialism in which destruction became an ironic sign of progress in a period 
grappling with an explosion of records’.75
The Grigg committee received submissions from government departments76 and 
inspected ‘representative registries’,77 examining their procedures for ‘reviewing papers 
for destruction or preservation’,78 and it is not remarkable that it came to conclude that 
there was a manifest and urgent need to reduce the volume of records that could and 
should be saved. ‘Few of these’, it declared, ‘will need to be preserved, but their very 
number greatly complicates the process of deciding which should be preserved, and 
which destroyed’.79 The committee’s deliberations were described by Kenneth Clucas, 
its secretary, as having been governed throughout by a ‘general feeling . . . that the PRO 
 72 ‘Weeding the rolls’ in The Times, 9 July 1954.
 73 See Lawes, Chancery Lane, pp. 37, 59.
 74 TNA, PRO 1/1445, undated note.
 75 Email 25 Nov. 2014.
 76 Including a memorandum from Margaret Gowing, then at the Cabinet Office. She also submitted a note under 
her own name, at the Sir James’ invitation, with the title of ‘A war historian’s experience of a departmental registry’. 
Amongst other matters, she reported that ‘Many important papers were never registered. . . . Very frequently there 
is no record of meetings of off icials when important policies were decided. . . . We had numerous examples of 
important f iles that had been lost. . . ’ TNA, T 222/989.
 77 TNA, T 222/989, K. Clucas, secretary of the committee to Sir Thomas Lloyd, under secretary of state, Colonial 
Office, 25 Aug. 1952.
 78 TNA, T 222/989, K. Clucas to G. May, private secretary to Sir Harold Emmerson, permanent secretary of the 
Ministry of Works, 27 Nov. 1952.
 79 Committee on departmental records, Report, pp. 5-6.
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needed a shake up’,80 and it worked under a powerful, impatient chairman who could 
be temperamental,81 blunt,82 irascible,83 ‘peppery and given to strong language.’84 It was 
a forceful and independently-minded body, ‘nothing if not bold’,85 and its reasoning 
appeared – on the surface at least – to have been largely impervious to the accepted 
procedures and thinking of Government archivists.86 
There was in particular to be a very deliberate rupture not only with past practice in 
Whitehall and the PRO but also with its champion, the deputy keeper of the records. 
Although he was quite adamant that he should be a member of the new committee,87 
precautions were taken to exclude Sir Hilary, ‘the doyen of the archival profession 
in the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth’,88 a man described as a ‘giant’,89 
the writer of the ‘first book of its kind based on English experience’90 of archive 
administration, from any of its proceedings.
Sir Hilary was a man publicly honoured, a leader in his field nationally and 
internationally,91 and a scholar who had written prolifically about such diverse matters 
as court handwriting in early and later medieval England; parish records; Jewish history 
and archives; the study of English common law records; the records of the English 
african companies; the plea rolls of the exchequer; the financial records of the reign 
of King John; seals in the PRO, and much else. He was, and remains, an inf luential 
figure, ‘the most eminent archivist of his generation in the English-speaking world’,92 
who stressed the hazards and uncertainties of weeding the archives, of attempting to 
 80 TNA, PRO 30/98/18, Notes etc. of conversations with Jeffery Ede . . . [and] Sir Kenneth Clucas 1985–1989.
 81 John Cantwell refers to the work of the committee being for a while jeopardised by an unspecif ied crisis. He 
recorded that ‘At one point [Sir James] was threatening resignation – Sir K could not recall the exact incident – but 
after a lapse of some weeks in Cttee business, Sir K (evidently a model of tact) persuaded him to take up the task once 
more’. He then added: ‘Actually, it had to do with the feeling of the historians that either the Treasury or the PRO 
should have some power of enforcement, which Sir J. G. considered unconstitutional’. Ibid.
 82 His entry in the ODNB reports how Herbert Morrison recalled that ‘Grigg had a considerable f lair for 
frank speech, aggravated by a hot temper. I recall a day at No. 10 when we were all waiting to enter the Cabinet 
Room. I was chatting to Sir James and we began mildly to disagree. In a matter of a moment or two he was 
denouncing me and being extremely rude. I mildly enquired who was having a row with whom. Sir John Anderson, 
another civil servant turned minister, who was present on this occasion, said “It’s all right, Herbert. You need not 
be upset. It’s just James’s way of talking. He can’t help it”.’ H. Morrison, Herbert Morrison: An Autobiography (1960), 
p. 207.
 83 He was said to have called Margaret Gowing ‘a long-nosed bitch’, for instance, TNA, PRO 30/98/18, Visit to 
Sir Kenneth Clucas, 18 Feb. 1988.
 84 Ibid.
 85 F. Hull, ‘Jenkinson and the ‘acquisitive’ record off ice’ in Journal of the Society of Archivists, vi (1), Apr. 1978, 
p. 2. 
 86 Although the report does state that the embassies of a number of countries were consulted.
 87 Edward Playfair said that ‘he insists on being a member of the committee himself. He sees no conceivable reason 
against it. . . . there must be on the committee an expert in the conservation of archives’. T222/538, Edward Playfair 
to Mr Johnston, 22 Jan. 1952.
 88 W. Neil Franklin, review of Essays in memory of Sir Hilary Jenkinson, ed. A. Hollaender, in The American Archivist, 
xxvi (4), Oct. 1963, p. 504.
 89 Journal of the Society of Archivists, i (1), Apr. 1955), p. 10. 
 90 J. Davies, ‘Memoir of Sir Hilary Jenkinson’, in Studies Presented to Sir Hilary Jenkinson, ed. J. Davies (1957), 
p. xxii.
 91 He had been a member of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts, vice-president of the British 
Records Association, president of the Society of Archivists, president of the Jewish Historical Society of England, 
a member of the UNESCO committee of expert archivists, and much else. He was awarded the CBE in 1943 and a 
knighthood in 1949.
 92 O. Holmes, ‘Sir Hilary Jenkinson, 1882-1961’ in The American Archivist, xxiv (3), July 1961, p. 345.
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anticipate the demands which future historians might place on them,93 or of allowing 
archivists to prune records themselves (they might, he said, be guilty of prejudices that 
would distort the impartiality of selection)94. Records were simply what administrators 
had chosen to keep for their own employment, and what counted was their official 
origin and continuous use. All items of ‘ephemeral value’ should have been deleted 
before they ever reached what he called the ‘Record’ stage,95 but once identified as 
records they had to be treated as inviolate.96 His was an emphatically self-denying 
ordinance which prevented the archivist from playing the activist role in record 
management which the Treasury sought (Terry Cook aptly called it a ‘curatorial, 
neutered, and self-deprecating professional mind-set’97). In that critical year of 1951, 
under threat from the Treasury and its new mode of management, he repeated that:
The Public Records are not an artif icial Collection, the size and scope of which can 
be precisely limited or predicted, but a Natural Accumulation which grows, and 
must continue to grow, with the continuance and growth of Public Administration: 
to solve satisfactorily the problem of their Housing is not therefore a question 
merely of calculating their bulk at a given moment and obtaining an amount of 
building and shelves sufficient to accommodate it, but of securing a space adequate 
for expansion over a very long term of years . . .98
His critics were not to be quelled. It was, said Hans Rasmussen, their consensual 
judgement that the PRO under Sir Hilary’s management was inept and ‘famously 
antiquarian’.99 Sir Hilary was known to be ill-disposed to the kind of radical re-
structuring which the Treasury might propose,100 and his own principles of record 
management were generally dismissed as passé, but it was not solely for those reasons 
he was shunned. It was an ad hominem matter. Officials disliked the man and his amour 
 93 He said (1937) that documents become archives when ‘having ceased to be in current use, they are definitely set 
aside for preservation, tacitly adjudged worthy of being kept. The diff iculty is that it is impossible to predict with 
any certainty what future historians will consider worthy of being kept. We are left’, he continued, ‘with a growing 
conviction that destruction of any . . . Archives we have received from the past is a course that a conscientious 
Archivist must f ind it diff icult to comment. . . . It has emerged with tolerable clearness . . . that the Archivist is not 
and should not be primarily concerned with the modern interests which his Archives at any given time may serve. 
He is concerned to keep their qualities intact for the use, perhaps, in the future, of students working upon subjects 
which neither he nor any one else has contemplated. . . . we f ind the conclusion unavoidable that destruction is an 
operation which can only be practised with undoubted safety in one case – that of word-for-word duplicates: all 
other proposed criteria are fallacious; and in any case there is great diff iculty in f inding suitable persons to carry 
them out’. Hilary Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration (1937), pp. 8, 145-6, 147. Two years later he returned 
to that theme. He was, he said, unable to condone ‘the destruction of Records or . . . [suggest] that any qualities 
of scholarship or experience will make it possible to “choose” with certainty out of a mass of records those which 
future historians will f ind most useful’. H. Jenkinson ‘The Choice of Records for Preservation’ in The Library Association 
Record, Nov. 1939, p. 1. 
 94 Jenkinson, Manual of Archive Administration, Part 3. And see F. Hull, ‘The archivist should not be an historian’ in 
Journal of the Society of Archivists, vi (5), Apr. 1980, p. 253. 
 95 Although quite how that was to be done seems never to have been spelled out thoroughly.
 96 He admitted on p. 151 of A Manual of Archive Administration that the modern administrator might, faced with 
‘impossible accumulations’, have to destroy records but that once they become archived there are ‘great objections 
to any destruction’.
 97 T. Cook, ‘The archive(s) is a foreign country: Historians, archivists, and the changing archival landscape’ in The 
American Archivist, lxxiv (2), Fall/Winter 2011, p. 608.
 98 113th report of the deputy keeper of the records (1952 for 1951), p. 3. In some measure, his rival, the American archivist, 
Theodore Schellenberg, would not disagree. ‘Archival institutions’, he argued, ‘do not collect materials’. And he 
went on to say that ‘This point has been made very clear by Sir Hilary Jenkinson . . .’ T. Schellenberg, Modern archives 
principles and techniques (1956), p. 19.
 99 H. Rasmussen; ‘Record management and the decline of the English archival establishment, 1949–1956’ in 
Libraries & the Cultural Record , xlv (4), 2010, p. 447. 
100 Eastwood talked about how ‘his obstinacy about principle kept him from being named to the Grigg Committee 
. . .’. T. Eastwood, ‘Jenkinson’s Writings on Some Enduring Archival Themes’ in The American Archivist, lxvii (1), 
Spring–Summer, 2004, p. 35.
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propre. He was considered to be too self-confident, too much of a grandee, too lordly,101 
too much the ‘absolutist . . . who defended his archival principles with the passion of 
a preacher defending moral principles’.102 Sir Edward Bridges, in charge of setting up 
the committee, said of one preparatory meeting in early January 1952 that he was, 
‘obviously going to be extremely difficult to deal with. He was touchy and acid to a 
degree. He was resentful of the O. & M. investigation. He says that he is the world 
authority on the subject and that everything will be simple if only his methods are 
adopted at once’.103 Sir Edward’s conclusion, voiced 18 days later, was that he 
felt it would be most unfortunate if Sir Hilary Jenkinson were to be made a member 
of the Committee. . . . His talent seems to me to be quite extraordinarily narrow 
and his vanity great. As soon as he steps outside his own particular speciality, 
which is the conservation of archives, in the narrowest sense of the word, he is apt 
to make the most careless and obvious mistakes from unwillingness to question his 
own beliefs. . . . He would try to run [the committee] himself and would infuriate 
all the members . . .104 
His colleague, Edward Playfair, third secretary at the Treasury, the man with 
responsibility for the division that dealt with the arts and science, concurred. Sir 
Hilary, he said, was an ‘old mountain of prejudice’, ‘a real cough-drop. . . . he talks 
incessantly and is perfectly convinced that he knows all the answers’. The committee 
would have ‘the most awful time’105 if Sir Hilary were allowed to join it. And if the 
chief archivist had to be excluded so, by extension, it was concluded, it would be 
impossible not to banish his lesser colleagues in the PRO. Sir Edward added that he 
was ‘quite determined to try to get an enquiry . . . which should be composed entirely 
of external persons – no serving civil servants of any kind’.106 
Sir Edward was to have his way. In February 1952, he wrote to William Armstrong, 
the principal private secretary to the chancellor of the exchequer, 
We face a row with the Master of the Rolls about the earth-shaking question of 
whether Sir Hilary Jenkinson should or should not be a member of the proposed 
enquiry into the accumulation of Departmental records. Does the Chancellor 
know the Master of the Rolls well? I would like to know whether [we] could play 
the card of asking the Chancellor to see the master of the rolls, as I am afraid that 
I shall f ind it diff icult to persuade him of the point’.107 
Such a meeting did indeed take place precisely one month later, and, for diplomatic 
reasons, the question of the membership of the committee was quietly smuggled in 
as but one of a number of points mooted for discussion. An anticipatory draft letter 
of 8 February which had been prepared for the chancellor put the problem delicately: 
101 See R. Ellis, ‘Recollections of Sir Hilary Jenkinson’ in Journal of the Society of Archivists, iv (4), Oct. 1971), p. 262.
102 Holmes, ‘Sir Hilary Jenkinson’, p. 346.
103 TNA, T 222/538, Note of 4 Jan. 1952.
104 TNA, T 222/538, 22 Jan. 1952.
105 TNA, T 222/538, Note to Sir Edward Bridges, 1 Feb. 1952.
106 Sir James would be told in the letter of invitation of 8 Apr. 1952 from Sir Edward Bridges that ‘The Committee 
would have no serving civil servants on it and we should hope to keep it small and select’. Churchill Archives Centre, 
Cambridge (hereafter CAC), PJGG10(2).
107 TNA, T 222/538, Sir Edward Bridges to Mr Armstrong, 4 Feb. 1952. 
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I feel, for reasons which I can explain in greater detail when we meet, that the 
usefulness of the committee will be greatly increased if no serving civil servant is 
a member of it. I know that this gives you great diff iculty because of the Deputy 
Keeper’s unique experience, which you feel should be directly at the service of 
the committee throughout its deliberations. Perhaps we could have a word about 
this.108 
There had then followed the conversation about ‘whether Jenkinson should be on the 
committee. On this the master of the rolls was very helpful. He suggested at one time 
that Evans, the Principal Assistant Keeper should be a member of the committee but 
agreed in the end that the simplest line was to take the view that no official should be 
on the committee at all’.109 
It was not only the master of the rolls who was very helpful. The chancellor of 
the exchequer had also secured the prime minister’s blessing for the deputy keeper’s 
blackballing in April 1952, having told him that ‘this is a question on which fresh 
minds are needed and we shall do much better if we do not have on the committee 
representatives either of the creators or the hoarders of files’.110 It was an irresistible 
show of force. 
It thus looks as if much of the personal inf luence which domestic government 
archivists – the hoarders of files – might have been able to wield had been driven 
off-stage. The officials of the PRO were allowed to observe the occasional meeting; 
submit ‘a considerable body of preliminary information’;111 and, chief ly through John 
Collingridge, keep in touch with the committee’s secretary, Kenneth Clucas.112 They 
could comment on drafts. But they had no direct hand in writing the report, and Sir 
Hilary was not even shown an advance copy of the final version or told when it would 
be published.113 The secretary, for his part, had preferred to keep his distance from a 
man who was himself said not ‘to like anyone to come too near’.114 He later reported 
that:
he did not have a great deal to do with [Sir Hilary] personally . . . [he] thought that 
the stories he had heard from Treasury colleagues probably biased him against him 
and he was not struck by any exceptional qualities. . . . he had written most of the 
Report himself and had his tongue in his cheek when alluding to certain of Sir H 
J’s assertions, as in his definition of ‘records’.115 
108 TNA, T 222/538.
109 TNA, T 222/538, Note for Record. 
110 TNA, T 222/53, Letter of 18 Apr. 1952. 
111 See the 114th Report of the deputy keeper of the records, p. 7.
112 Kenneth Clucas, 1921–2010, was a principal at H.M. Treasury 1952–54. He became permanent secretary at the 
Department of Trade, 1979–82, and was knighted in 1976. He drafted all but a single paragraph of the report.
113 What Sir Hilary said in diplomatic fashion at the time was “By the kindness of the Chairman, Sir James Grigg, 
I and my Colleagues principally concerned have been kept informed of the progress of this Committee and enabled 
at some stages to offer our observations; but as its Report has not yet been presented (though I understand it may be 
expected shortly) I am not in a position to make any comment. See the 115th Report of the deputy keeper of the records 
(1954 for 1953), p. 2. 
114 See Ellis, ‘Recollections’, p. 266.
115 TNA, PRO 30/98/18, Visit to Sir Kenneth Clucas, 18 Feb. 1988. The actual passage to which he referred 
read: ‘“Records” the Deputy Keeper has stated to be synonymous with “archives”, a term which he has defined as 
meaning “Documents drawn up for the purpose of, or used during, the conduct of affairs of any kind, of which they 
themselves formed a part, and subsequently preserved by the persons responsible for the transactions in question, or 
their successors, in their own custody for their own reference”. For our own purposes it will be convenient to modify 
this definition slightly . . .’ Committee on departmental records; Report, para. 1.
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So it was that officials of the PRO tended to be held at arm’s length. They returned 
only afterwards, when Sir Hilary had left his post in April 1954, to a re-born 
institution under a new deputy keeper where they prepared guidance for a new breed 
of departmental record officers. In what The Times headlined a ‘plan for relief of 
Record Office’,116 the report (in Sir James Grigg’s words) ‘roasted’ Sir Hilary and his 
‘antiquated, unworkable scheduling system’117 that was based on retaining the structure 
of the PRO intact and a notion of the archive as a repository, a natural growth which was 
‘as much an organism as a tree or animal’,118 that should be fiercely protected for as yet 
undetermined future use.119 It proposed in its stead the introduction of a revolutionary, 
rationalised, comprehensive, formally-structured and busily interventionist model of 
retention and destruction. 
Sir Hilary’s published riposte was a partial, grudging acceptance of the report – the 
growth in the mass of modern records had got out of hand120 and it did need reining 
in – but he also issued a warning that that a shift to managerialism would only imperil 
the professional standards of the archivist. ‘There will be a tendency’, he protested, ‘to 
employ for the administration of Modern Archives, if that is made a separate affair, 
persons of a lower educational grade, or, at least, persons not qualified by special 
training to act as Archivists’.121 But most disagreed. They believed that the committee 
had had no choice in the matter. 
Kenneth Clucas told Sir James that he ‘had successfully dusted the kingdom’s 
archives’.122 The keeper of the records and master of the rolls remarked to Sir James that 
his recommendations were ‘absolutely right. At any rate, I have heard of no sensible 
alternative to what you have proposed’.123 Margaret Gowing, Sir William Hancock’s 
collaborator as official historian, a woman who could be most critical of the state of the 
records, one of the committee’s members, said that ‘there is now at least a good chance, 
where none existed before, of preventing chaos in the legacy of government records 
that the twentieth century will bequeath to its luckless descendants’.124 
There was little mourning for the prospective loss of historical records. That had 
never been the focal concern. Even in the profession’s own mouthpiece, the Journal 
of the Society of Archivists, an eager commentator pronounced that ‘The report rightly 
assumes that a large proportion of the documents created in a department should 
be destroyed as of no value to anybody. Those that are kept must be worthy of the 
116 ‘State papers by the mile’ in The Times, 9 July 1954.
117 Rasmussen; ‘Record management’, p. 457. 
118 ‘The English archivist – a new profession’, speech at University College London to launch the new school of 
archives, 1947. In that same lecture he defined archives as ‘the documents accumulated by a natural process in the 
Conduct of Affairs, of any kind, public or private, at any date; and preserved thereafter for Reference, in their own 
custody, by the persons responsible for the affairs in question or their successors’. Hans Rasmussen remarked that 
this was not ‘a notion unique to Jenkinson, but rather as a statement on the inherent characteristic of archives being 
organically created from the regular course of business of the creating body. Schellenberg used it approvingly to 
distinguish archives, which receive records, from libraries that collect them’ (email, 25 Nov. 2014).
119 See N. Ceeney, ‘The role of a 21st-century National Archive – The relevance of the Jenkinsonian tradition, and 
a redefinition for the information society’ in Journal of the Society of Archivists, xxix (1), 2008, 57-71.
120 He said of the Grigg Report that some of its proposals were common sense and that he had enunciated them 
himself in the past. And he then added that ‘I incline myself to think . . . that, failing substantial diminution in the 
accrual of written matter . . . [an] ultimate intrusion of selection based on the interests of research [after 25 years] is 
inevitable. But note that none of the pruning process is made the task of the Archivist. The business of the Keepers 
of Archives is still . . . to keep them’. (Emphasis in the original). Sir Hilary Jenkinson, ‘Roots’ in Journal of the Society 
of Archivists, ii (4), Oct. 1960), pp. 136-7.
121 Sir Hilary Jenkinson, ‘The future of archives in England’ in Journal of the Society of Archivists, i (3), Apr. 1956, 
p. 60.
122 CAC, PJGG10(2), Letter to Sir James Grigg, 8 Nov. 1957.
123 CAC, PJGG10(2), Letter to Sir James Grigg, 27 Feb. 1957.
124 CAC, PJGG10(2), Letter to Sir James Grigg, 18 July 1954.
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endless trouble and expense that their retention will entail – valuable accommodation, 
equipment, cleaning, preservation and repairs through the centuries. Selection must 
be drastic . . .’125 And that adjective – ‘drastic’ – began to creep into the vocabulary 
of record management at the time,126 part, as it were, of a new language of crisis 
management and purging. Culling was to be all. A note for the record, lodged in 
a Treasury file about impending legislation, announced that ‘the new principles of 
reviewing’ required ‘destroying everything that is not wanted instead of destroying 
only what is specified on a Schedule’. But it then added the seemingly nervous caution 
‘Best not include in the Bill, but cover in Rules, to be made by the Lord Chancellor 
under the Act’.127 
Individual government departments would now assume responsibility for 
administering that drastic new selection process under the general supervision of a 
new public records department;128 the management of the new department (against the 
wishes of the master of the rolls129 and senior officials of the Public Record Office130) 
would be transferred to a minister of the Crown; and inspectors would be appointed 
to ensure that the new arrangements were being conducted properly (there were to be 
four such inspectors at first and they were in position by September 1956). 
Government ministries were in their turn to appoint a suitable internal official, a 
departmental records officer,131 to take charge of their papers, and in a manner not 
unlike the three-stage life cycle for records, review them five years after they had 
‘passed out of active use’ (para. 80) and then destroy those which were no longer 
needed132 (and the first such officers were nominated in May 1956 – there were to 
be officers in post in 64 departments by the end of the next year). Any records not 
thus discarded were to be reviewed again after 25 years, and those considered no 
longer to be of historical or administrative importance were to be destroyed (para. 
87). Records that did succeed in passing that second muster were to be kept only if 
they were deemed still to be of administrative use, and the remainder were to be sent 
for safekeeping to the Public Record Office (although the criteria for identifying 
historical importance were not clearly identified at the time). That was not to be the 
end of the matter. Attrition could continue. The archivists of the Public Record Office 
125 P. Jones, ‘The Grigg Report’, p. 7.
126 For example, TNA, T 216/37, note on ‘Action on the Grigg Report’, 19 Dec. 1955.
127 TNA, T 216/37, undated.
128 Charles Johnson, sometime assistant keeper, Public Record Office, asserted after the publication of the Grigg 
report and before the passing of legislation that ‘The business of co-operating closely with the registries of other 
Departments in the economical disposal of modern papers by means of a Records Administration Officer with staff 
of inspecting off icers will require an extension of the administrative and executive work of the Office . . . There will 
thus be a smaller proportion of off icers engaged in that part of the work which demands a knowledge of languages, 
law, or history’, quoted by C. Johnson, ‘The Public Record Office’, in Studies Presented to Sir Hilary Jenkinson, p. 194. 
Michael Roper described the process of selection having become a ‘ joint responsibility of the department and the 
Public Record Office’ (M. Roper, ‘Modern departmental records and the Record Office’ in Journal of the Society of 
Archivists, iv (5), Apr. 1972, p. 401.
129 Lord Evershed wrote to George Coldstream on 24 June 1955 that, should the role be transferred, no one could 
‘think otherwise than that the off ice of the Master of the Rolls (as such and by that title) would cease to exist – on 
the ground that its raison d’etre had gone’, TNA, T216/347, Grigg Committee, General Policy Papers.
130 D. Evans, the principal assistant keeper of records, reported to Sir George Coldstream that ‘The Office regrets 
especially that the Committee . . . found it necessary to “recommend that the headship of the Public Record 
Office” should be transferred from the Master of the Rolls to a Minister of the Crown . . .’ TNA, PRO 1/1445, 
Memorandum on some of the main proposals contained in the report of the committee on public records’, n.d. 
131 The prime duty of the off icer was described as being ‘to ensure that his function is as widely known within his 
department as possible and, in particular, that he is regarded as the authoritative, natural source of advice on any 
matters connected with records’. Manual of Records Administration (1983), 2.1.3. 
132 The f irst reference in the f iles to the proposed new system was an anonymous note, dated 25 Oct. 1952, which 
made no allusion to the origin of the scheme other than to ‘the various ideas on this subject that have been ventilated 
in discussion and elsewhere’, TNA, T 222/989.
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were obliged to keep their own stock of documents under ‘continuous review’ and, 
in consultation with the relevant departments, dispose of those which were thought 
no longer to justify retention. (Under the Public Record Act, this would require the 
consent of the lord chancellor and the procedure is very rarely adopted.)
The proposals received a guarded endorsement from the PRO in September 1954.133 
A memorandum to Sir Alexander Johnston, a third secretary at the Treasury who was 
in charge of controlling departmental expenditure, from David Evans, Sir Hilary’s 
successor as the new deputy keeper of the records and later, very brief ly, the first 
occupant of the new post of keeper of the records, said, a little optimistically perhaps, 
that he took it that the report ‘boils down to recommending strongly that our present 
organisation under Collingridge [the PRO’s liaison officer] be augmented in status, 
numbers and authority to deal with the immediate problems and to introduce in due 
course the new procedure.’ But he and his colleagues were also disturbed about the 
prospect of administrative upheaval, and he added, in one of the very rare references 
to the matter, that: 
Historians . . . will examine carefully the proposals that the responsibility for 
deciding what records are to be retained at the First Review should rest with 
the Departments themselves . . . They may wish to be assured that the very large 
quantity of papers (50 to 90 per cent is the estimate) that will be destroyed within 
a few years of compilation do not contain classes of document that may be of 
considerable interest to posterity though not to present administration. They may 
be disturbed by the fact that the introduction of these new and drastic proposals 
will coincide with the transfer of responsibility from the century-old charge of the 
Master of the Rolls to a more remote Departmental Minister.134 
His observation was ignored. An undated ‘Paper for Home Affairs Committee 
Paper’, prepared for the lord chancellor by the financial secretary to the Treasury, 
acknowledged in the new, commonplace terminology that the proposal for a system of 
first and second review: 
is a drastic one. It may well involve destroying some records that future historians 
would like to see. But there were three historians and a University librarian135 
on the Committee, and other historians (who were consulted informally) were 
satisf ied. There has been, as far as I am aware, no serious criticism of the Report 
after publication. In brief, the Committee’s view is that a substantial amount of 
destruction is inevitable in any case; and that the amount of significant material 
that might be lost in this way is likely to be less than under any other system which 
it would be practicable to adopt. . . . I ask my colleagues to agree that the general 
principle of Reviews after about 5 years and about 25 years respectively, and of 
destruction on the criteria recommended, should be accepted. . . .136
133 Although the keeper of the records did write to Sir James Grigg on 18 Feb. 1954 expressing his unhappiness 
about the implied criticisms in the report: it was ‘less than fair at a number of points in that it set out the diff iculties 
inherent in any system of Elimination, and criticised weaknesses and deficiencies in existing arrangements . . . 
without any indication that Officers of the Record Office were aware of the diff iculties and sought anxiously to 
minimise the weaknesses and deficiencies.’ TNA, PRO 1/1445.
134 TNA, PRO 1/1530, letter to Sir Alexander Johnston, 3 Sept. 1954.
135 Margaret Gowing (then a member of the historical section of the Cabinet Office, nominated by her colleague, 
Professor Hancock); Professor J.G. Edwards, director of the Institute of Historical Research in the University of 
London; and Sir John Habakkuk, Chichele professor of economic history at Oxford. The Librarian was Harry 
Creswick, the librarian of Cambridge University. 
136 And that was to be the nub of the case in an undated Memorandum to Cabinet submitted by the chancellor of the 
exchequer in the spring of 1954, TNA, T 218/82. 
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And, as an ironic, crowning argument, Sir Hilary himself could be summoned in 
support of the contention that it was quite impossible to gauge the potential historical 
importance of records. A review of his magnum opus, the Manual of Archive Administration, 
conducted by Kenneth Clucas for Sir James Grigg, applauded his stance that archivists 
and historians were not at all well placed to determine the future interest of present 
documents – the only credible judge was the administrator.137 The secretary wrote to 
Sir James on the 23 September 1952 that he had spoken to J.R. Simpson, the director 
of organisation and methods at the Treasury, about the idea that there should be a:
joint inspecting staff of O and M plus P.R.O., with a Committee of historians in 
the background, to deal with questions of historical importance . . . The more 
I consider Jenkinson’s arguments in his book the more interesting I f ind it. It 
is, indeed, remarkable that anyone should be able, at one and the same time, to 
hold these views and yet find nothing wrong with the present system whereby 
destruction schedules are approved by archivists in collaboration with, in diff icult 
cases, with historians. I like, both in principle and in practice, his thesis that neither 
the archivist nor the historian should play any part in the selection of documents 
for retention . . . I think he is right in wanting to have a system where it is the 
administrator who decides what to keep. To make the historian the final arbiter is 
not at all satisfactory. It is impossible for any man to forecast what the historian of 
anything but the immediate future will require . . . . Let the archives of the future 
be records of the conduct of work in Government Departments as it is actually 
carried out, and let the administrators decide what is to be kept.138
The director’s reply to the secretary had been enthusiastic: 
To my intense surprise I found very little in your summary of Sir Hilary’s Manual 
with which to quarrel . . . I think there is a distinct possibility that we could go 
quite a long way with Sir Hilary and I particularly like his argument that it is 
impossible to look at public records from the point of view of what will interest 
historians of the future . . .’139 
Sir Hilary’s own comment was a little opaque but he did not seem to dissent from the 
way in which he had been represented by the Secretary: ‘What I said was . . . a scrutiny 
from the point of view solely of historic interest “might possibly intrude” but that 
this was “to be employed only with due precaution” and that in most cases it would 
probably be best to omit it’.140 
‘The Archivist’, it had been agreed, ‘is not and ought not to be an Historian’.141 
It was not to be the projected interests of posterity or future historians that drove 
the committee. It was not to be historians who would be awarded a formal role in 
record management. The Grigg report went to Cabinet on 3 March 1955 where the 
sole problem discussed was ‘the expediency of opening Cabinet records to public 
inspection after 50 years’.142 That was a sticking point, a matter of key interest to 
ministers whose deliberations would no longer be confidential, and it was agreed, in 
137 See the commentary of E. Honer and S. Graham, ‘Should users have a role in determining the future archive? 
The approach adopted by the Public Record Office, the UK National Archives to the selection of records for 
permanent preservation’ in Liber Quarterly, xi, 2001, p. 384.
138 TNA, T 222/540, Letter 23 Sept. 1952, Sir Hilary Jenkinson’s ‘Manual of Archive Administration’.
139 TNA, T 222/540, Letter of 25 Sept. 1952. Sir Hilary Jenkinson’s ‘Manual of Archive Administration’.
140 TNA, T 222/540, Letter to K. Clucas, 13 Oct. 1952, Sir Hilary Jenkinson’s ‘Manual of Archive Administration’.
141 Sir Hilary Jenkinson, quoted in P. Harvey, ‘Archives in Britain: Anarchy or policy?’ in American Archivist, vi (1), 
Winter 1983, p. 22.
142 C.C. (55) 20th Conclusions.
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the prime minister’s words, that it should be ‘subject to further study and thought’. The 
question of access was duly referred three weeks later to a meeting of senior officials 
which endorsed the recommendation that records should be open to public inspection 
only after fifty years, subject to the caveat ‘that Government Departments should retain 
discretion to withhold particular classes of documents of their own choice from such 
inspection’.143 The report then returned to Cabinet on 7 June 1955, where it was 
presented by its secretary, Sir Norman Brook, as ‘a rational and comprehensive scheme 
for reducing to order the chaotic arrangements for pruning Departmental records and 
ensuring that those of importance are accessible to historians of the future in the public 
record office’.144 It was there concluded that the chancellor of the exchequer should 
give effect to as many of the report’s proposals as possible, whilst giving yet more time 
to a consideration of the problem of the 50-year rule.145 The government promptly 
announced its acceptance of the main proposals,146 although the timing of the right 
of public inspection was a predicament that was to detain officials for several months 
more.
John Collingridge was appointed as the very first records administration officer in 
December 1955 (it had been the grading of his new, and, some thought, anomalous 
position that had also delayed progress);147 and a number of the committee’s other 
recommendations had already been implemented by the time a Bill was presented, after 
protracted internal discussion about details of structure, remuneration and staffing,148 
to an ill-attended Parliament in December 1957.149 But there were some few matters 
that did demand legislation,150 and it was to the threat of a looming torrent of paper 
which the lord chancellor, Viscount Kilmuir, the man who was about to take charge 
of the problem, again referred in opening the debate:
I am told that the Public Record Office has, in Chancery Lane and in the 
repository at Ashridge, about 46½ miles of shelves full of records; and there are, 
143 TNA, CAB 130/109, Notes of a meeting held in Sir Norman Brook’s room, Cabinet Office.
144 TNA, PREM 11/911Memorandum to the prime minister, 21 Feb. 1955. 
145 C.M. (55) 12th Conclusions
146 HC Deb 5 July 1955, dxliii, cols 957-60.
147 There was some uncertainty about whether he could and should be appointed to the new post. One of the 
problems was what the master of the rolls called the untidiness of the creation of ‘one anomalous Officer’ in the 
PRO, CAC, PJGG10(2), letter to Sir James Grigg, 11 Nov. 1955. Discussion about the dilemma was also reported in 
the Treasury f ile, Public Record Office: Action arising out of committee on departmental records Report (Grigg) 
(TNA, 218/82). 
148 For example, an internal Treasury note of 29 June 1955 reported that ‘(1) nothing has been definitely clinched. 
(2) discussion has centred largely on particular points of disagreement, notably – the grading of Inspecting Officers; 
the general attempt to diminish the A.K. [Assistant Keeper] empire (by devolving minor duties to Executives – in 
particular the loss of 2 AK (Directing) posts . . . I think we shall have to start pretty well de novo. . . .’ A later note 
of 1 Nov. 1955 reported that ‘The P.R.O. memorandum is noticeably more polite than those we were wont to 
receive from Sir H.J. [Hilary Jenkinson, the Keeper of the Records] and, up to a point, more accommodating. Quite 
a number of recommendations have been accepted in whole or in part. But, as we feared, all those having adverse 
staff ing implications have been rejected’. What particularly exercised some of those constructing the new PRO was 
whether insiders should be appointed to senior positions, and especially to the new post of keeper of the records. 
There was an evident interest in breaking what was held to be a conservative archival tradition. The appointment 
of Sir Hilary’s successor, Sir David Evans, was opposed within the Treasury, and he occupied the position of keeper 
only between 1959 and 1960. The next keeper, Stephen Wilson, serving between 1960 and 1966, had worked in 
the PRO between 1928–9, but was effectively something of an outsider, having been a civil servant in various 
departments of state until 1950, and then an employee of the Iron and Steel Corporation of Great Britain and the 
Iron and Steel Holding and Realisation Agency. His successor, Harold Cottam Johnson, was again an insider, having 
joined the PRO as an assistant keeper in 1927.
149 See Cantwell, The Public Record Office, p. 1.
150 An undated draft letter, written in or about March 1954, to heads of departments on the Grigg Report’s 
recommendations about the future administration and staff ing of the PRO said that ‘These proposals, if accepted, 
will require legislation; but not at once. The idea is to have a transitional period of about f ive years and to introduce 
the legislation at the earliest convenient moment during that period’, TNA, T 218/82. 
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so it is estimated, a further 120 miles which are still retained by Government 
Departments, but which may ultimately be transferred to the Public Record Office 
for permanent preservation. This will present a considerable accommodation 
problem in the future. I learnt with surprise that the quantity of paper destroyed 
by Government Departments last year amounted to no less than 3,600 tons.151
It was a threat that was alluded to once more in March 1958 when the solicitor-
general, Sir Harry Hylton-Foster, the Shiva of the records, moved the second reading 
of the Bill in the House of Commons. His talk was all about the necessity, indeed the 
joy, of destruction:
I shudder to think of what it must have looked like to those working in the [Public 
Record] Office – a dreadful f lood of documents descending upon those scholarly 
and not underburdened civil servants who give such admirable public service. . . . It 
is plain, I submit, that there was dire need for the Bill . . . The new system is already 
under way, and the House will be interested to know how it is working. Of course, 
if it is to work well, it is essential that Departments must go through their records 
and destroy what is not worth keeping. In accordance with the recommendation of 
the Grigg Committee, in paragraph 131 of its Report, a Records Administration 
Officer has been appointed in the Public Record Office. There is some evidence 
that he and his inspecting officers are already playing a useful part. I take an almost 
sadistic satisfaction in thinking of these figures. It was estimated that the amount, 
or dead weight – if that be the happy description – of documents destroyed by 
the Departments in 1956 was 3,600 tons. Since the beneficial inf luence of the 
new system, the year 1957 produced an estimated quantity destroyed of 5,398 
tons in the year – about 60 miles of shelving, for those who like to be statistically 
minded . . .152
The one section of the Bill that excited parliamentary attention,153 just as it had earlier 
excited ministers and officials, was the proposal that records should be open to public 
inspection only after fifty years. That was considered by some Members of Parliament 
– the men and women who were supposed to scrutinise ministerial and official actions – 
to be too long, and it was put right ten years later.154 But the proposal that a substantial 
amount of destruction was both inevitable and desirable, and the criteria and methods 
that would have to be devised to achieve it, were neither defended nor explained155 
(the principal archives officer of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, E.E. Burke,156 commented 
that ‘The machinery for these arrangements is not stated, nor does the act indicate 
151 HL Deb 16 Dec. 1957, ccvi, cols 1147-81.
152 HC Deb 26 Mar. 1958, dlxxxv, cols 499-540.
153 See, for example, the home secretary’s answer to a parliamentary question put in July 1955: HC Deb 5 July 1955, 
dxliii, cols.957-60.
154 Ibid. That 50-year rule was later amended to 30 years under the Public Records Act 1967, c. 44: ‘An Act to reduce 
the period of f ifty years specif ied in section 5(1) of the Public Records Act 1958 as that for which certain public 
records must have been in existence for them to be available for public inspection’.
155 Even in 2000, the report of a public consultation by the Public Record Office stated that ‘To date, the PRO’s 
guidance to record reviewers has been of a rather general character and it has not attempted to articulate explicitly 
the values which underpin appraisal policy.’ Acquisition and Disposition Policies, Version 2.1 (Feb. 2000), 3.6. That 
neglect may be discerned elsewhere. For example, a fairly comprehensive review of Canadian archival policies 
omitted to deal with the problem of how many papers could and should be retained ( J. English , The role of the 
National Archives of Canada and the National Library of Canada (1998) http://capalibrarians.org/wp/wp-content/
uploads/2014/03/englishreport1999.pdf (accessed 15 Nov. 2016)
156 He was, for example, responsible for the collection of a large quantity of personal papers and papers from business 
and other organisations, unusual at the time in a national archive. See T. Baxter and E. Burke, Guide to the historical 
manuscripts in the National Archives of Rhodesia, (Salisbury, Rhodesia, 1970).
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what principles are to be applied to selection’).157 There was in their place the simple 
overriding presumption that, in the phrase of Lord Evershed, ‘there was a tremendous 
proliferation of paper in the modern State’,158 that almost all of it had to be jettisoned 
to avert a calamity, and the Bill’s focus should be on the proper safekeeping of the 
relatively few records of administrative interest that would be allowed to remain. What 
followed was drastically to mould the policies of the PRO and affect the possibilities of 
almost everything that we, as historians of the late twentieth century were able to do. 
157 E. Burke; ‘Some archival legislation of the British Commonwealth’ in The American Archivist, xxii (3), July 1959, 
pp. 281-2.
158 ‘Public Record law changes’ in The Times, 23 Mar. 1956.
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Rock.indd   69 03/02/2017   11:49:54
